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
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


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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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


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OK

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
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OK

5. GREEK TACTICS FOR CYPRUS DEBATE OUTLINED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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7. GHANA DECIDES ON DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE WITH USSR
[REDACTED]

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OK

8. INDONESIA LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO BLOC
AID [REDACTED]

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ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee [REDACTED]

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25X1A [REDACTED]

1. KHRUSHCHEV URGES WEST TO RECOGNIZE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE

25X1A Comment on:



In a statement to a group of ambassadors at a Burmese embassy reception on 3 December, Soviet party chief Khrushchev called for Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe as the "important thing" in lessening East-West tensions. He disparaged the "hopes" of the West that Communist control can be changed and called on the West to give up such an objective in exchange for a Soviet agreement not to attempt to change the system of government in capitalist countries. In reply to a question regarding the USSR's role if a Communist revolution took place in a capitalist state, Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union would not intervene, but would give the revolutionaries "sympathy."

Khrushchev reiterated that the question of German reunification must be settled directly by the Federal Republic and the East German regime and asserted that the USSR would not discuss the question even if the West "waited a hundred years."

The party chief also repeated the Soviet proposal that the NATO and Warsaw pact powers might be able to conclude a nonaggression agreement and the view that further progress in the UN disarmament talks depends on "balancing" the UN Disarmament Commission. When Ambassador Thompson pointed out the difficulty of serious negotiations in a further enlarged body, Khrushchev suggested that the size of the commission could be reduced in such a way as to "balance" its membership.

The ambassador believes that Khrushchev's remarks reflect Soviet long-range concern over the situation in Eastern Europe and fear of renewed satellite uprisings. Moscow may feel that the present international situation has improved the chances of gaining Western recognition of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.

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3. COMMUNISTS HAMPERED BY BERLIN'S FOUR-POWER STATUS

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Comment on: [redacted]

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[redacted] Berlin's status as
a city under quadripartite control is
inhibiting measures the East German
regime considers essential to close the
sector border between East and West Ber-
lin, [redacted]

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[redacted] the USSR had
given Party First Secretary Walter Ulbricht a free hand to
solve the Berlin problem, but there is evidence indicating
that he was warned not to violate the city's quadripartite
status. [redacted] rapid and drastic measures
are required to halt black marketing, stop the flow of cur-
rency and refugees to West Berlin, and obstruct the activity
of Western agents.

In a further move to enhance East Ger-
man sovereignty, Soviet officials at the Berlin Air Safety
Center on 4 December rejected for the third time an Amer-
ican request for clearance for a courier flight between Ber-
lin and Warsaw on the grounds that such clearance can be
given only by the German Democratic Republic, which, Soviet
officials say, has full control over its air space. The Rus-
sians then made an informal offer to submit American requests
for the "consideration of the authorities of the German Demo-
cratic Republic." The Allied position is that the USSR, as one
of the four occupying powers, is the only responsible authority
in East Germany. [redacted]

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4. SPAAK PROPOSES SPECIAL NATO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN MARCH

25X1A Comment on:



Secretary General Spaak's proposal for a special NATO ministerial conference next March to work out a unified military policy seems designed to speed up action by member governments on MC-70--the paper on the essential forces needed to carry out NATO's military mission--which is to be completed late in January.

In the draft of his report to be made at the 16-18 December NATO meeting, Spaak voices concern over the widening gap between forces requirements and country commitments. He feels that foreign, defense, and finance ministers and NATO military authorities should meet to analyze the MC-70 conclusions and agree on a distribution of commitments which might be more binding on the member countries than present Annual Review procedure.

Spaak's suggestion is designed to facilitate decisive action on politically sensitive subjects, by bringing together political, economic, and military officials at ministerial level at the outset of planning for whose implementation they would later be responsible. Spaak views the March conference as preparatory to decisions which would be taken at the regular spring NATO ministerial meeting usually held in May. The proposal has some points in common with recent British ideas on the need for a revised NATO strategy that "makes sense" and is economically feasible.

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5. GREEK TACTICS FOR CYPRUS DEBATE OUTLINED

25X1A Comment on:

[REDACTED] Greek Foreign Minister Averoff appears willing to accept postponement until next year of the UN Cyprus debate, scheduled to follow the current debate on Algeria.

He will be particularly receptive to postponement if the UN requests implementation of last February's General Assembly resolution calling for continued negotiations toward a settlement. Greece has consistently interpreted the proposed negotiations as involving only representatives of Britain and Cyprus.

Postponement of the debate would serve Greek interests by preventing Turkey from specifically being recognized as a participant in the dispute. The Greek government might even take the position that postponement affords a means for deferring a decision until Britain has a labor government, which would be more favorably disposed toward self-determination for Cyprus than is the present government.

In any UN Cyprus debate, the Greeks, pressed by Archbishop Makarios, are certain to bring up the issue of alleged British atrocities on Cyprus. London has indicated a desire for a short, smooth debate but has warned that if Greece raises the atrocities question, Britain will reply by presenting evidence that Athens and Makarios have been connected with past violence on Cyprus. [REDACTED]

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
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7. GHANA DECIDES ON DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE WITH USSR

25X1A Comment on:



Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana plans to announce, probably about 15 December, that his government will establish diplomatic relations with the USSR "in due

course." However, Accra apparently does not intend to exchange representatives until the latter part of next year.

Permanent Secretary for Defense and External Affairs Adu says the USSR was told that a personnel shortage precluded acceptance of a Soviet diplomatic establishment in the near future and that the Ghana government would not enter such a relationship until after its trade mission visits the Soviet Union "next July." Adu appeared confident that any Soviet effort to advance the timing of the exchange could be fore-stalled.

8. INDONESIA LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO BLOC AID

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25X1A Comment on:

Indonesia can be expected to be increasingly receptive to Soviet bloc offers of economic and technical assistance in view of the anti-Dutch drive which is almost certain to create a serious vacuum of technical talent.

According to two reliable sources, the Indonesian embassy in Moscow has been approached by Soviet officials with an offer of ships. According to another source, the Soviet embassy in Djakarta has requested permission to hold an atomic exposition in 1958 and has also asked if it may send survey teams to Indonesia to test land and water for radio-activity.

Approximately 1,000 Soviet jeeps have been delivered under a contract signed about a year ago for the purchase of 4,000. In addition, the Soviet aid agreement for \$100,000,000 is still awaiting implementation.

Faced with the probable loss of Dutch and Australian pilots and technicians, the Indonesian national airline is seeking the services of other foreign personnel. The British embassy in Djakarta has received a report that Indonesia has asked Poland to provide pilots and maintenance men.

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[redacted]

ANNEX

Watch Report 383, 5 December 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future. However, tensions in the Middle East continue to create possibilities for serious incidents.

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[redacted]